Strategies and capacities to tackle under-declared employment
Turning to how inspectorates can effectively transform under-declared employment into fully declared employment, two approaches exist, namely a 'hard' deterrence approach that increases the penalties and risks of detection so as to dissuade employers and employees from engaging in under-declared employment, and a 'soft' indirect controls approach which asserts that underdeclared employment arises when the beliefs and norms of employees and employers regarding the acceptability of engaging in under-declared work are not in symmetry with the codified laws and regulations. Here, therefore, attempts are made to align the norms and beliefs of employees and employers with the laws and regulations.
Evaluating the effectiveness of these two contrasting policy approaches, the evidencebase reveals that although the 'hard' deterrence approach is not effective in reducing the likelihood of employees engaging in under-declared employment, increasing the risks of detection is effective in reducing the likelihood of employers doing so. The 'soft' approach, however, is not only effective in reducing the likelihood of under-declared employment among both employees and to some extent employers. The result is that improving the perceived and actual risks of detection is the primary tool that should be used to change the behaviour of employers, and for a soft approach to be adopted as the primary tool for changing the behaviour of employees and as a secondary tool for changing behaviour of employers.
Improving the probability of detection of under-declared employment is difficult due to the problems of identifying this illegal wage practice during workplace inspections. This is because the employee is a formal employee with a written contract or terms of employment and a declared salary, and only 55% of employees receiving envelope wages would prefer full declaration. For this reason, a focus upon data matching is required, such as analysing whether businesses pay lower than the average wage for their region and sector. Identifying potential atrisk businesses, however, does not help at subsequent inspections since employers and employees may not admit they receive an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to their declared salary.
To tackle envelope wages, therefore, what is also required is awareness raising and education about the benefits of fully declared work targeted particularly at younger men and employers in the sectors stated above where envelope wages are prevalent. Such awareness raising, however, will not lead to self-regulation unless there are changes in the macro-level economic and social conditions highlighted above, and especially the perceived level of corruption and quality of governance that results in employers and employees engaging in underdeclared employment due to a belief that distributive and redistributive justice and fairness is lacking. A broader modernisation of governance is therefore required, the details of which will be included in a follow-up action plan and road map for tackling undeclared and under-declared work in Croatia.
INTRODUCTION
Not all employment can be simply classified as either declared or undeclared work. This is exemplified by 'under-declared employment' where a formal employer employs a formal employee who has a written contract or terms of employment and an official declared salary but in addition, the employee also receives an additional undeclared wage. Only one part of the wage is therefore paid officially. Given that there exists a custom in many European countries for employers to pay this undeclared salary in an envelope, the study of under-declared employment has become widely referred to as the study of 'envelope wage' practices (Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; Williams, 2007 Williams, , 2008a Williams, ,b, 2009a Williams and Padmore, 2013a,b; Round, 2007, 2008; Williams et al., 2011) .
There is widespread recognition in Croatia that this fraudulent practice exists, whereby employers reduce their tax and social contribution payments by paying their formal employees an official declared salary and an additional undeclared ('envelope') wage hidden from the authorities for tax and social security purposes. Until now, however, and not least because it is difficult to detect, there has been little understanding of its prevalence, characteristics and distribution. The intention in this report is therefore to evaluate its extent, characteristics and distribution, explain its existence and provide an evidence-based evaluation of the different policy approaches for tackling it. This will reveal not only that some policy approaches are more effective than others at reducing the likelihood of under-declared employment, and what works with employers differs from what works with employees, but also that there is a need to address some systemic features of the Croatian economy and society if this practice is to be effectively tackled.
Given that the aim is to evaluate the prevalence, characteristics and distribution of underdeclared employment in Croatia and how this can be addressed, the specific objectives will be to answer the following questions: , and how the prevalence and nature of under-declared employment varies spatially. With this empirical mapping of the prevalence, characteristics and distribution of under-declared employment in hand, section 5 then turns towards identifying the systemic drivers which determine the prevalence of under-declared employment followed in section 6 by the strategies and capacities for tackling this illegal wage practice. The outcome will be a set of broad policy recommendations for tackling under-declared employment which will be further elaborated in a follow-up action plan and road map for tackling undeclared and under-declared work in Croatia.
PREVALENCE OF UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT
The first extensive and cross-national representative survey of the prevalence of envelope wages was conducted in 2007. Special Eurobarometer no. 284 included 11,135 interviews with formal employees across the 27 member states of the European Union (EU-27). This revealed that across the EU-27, 5.5 per cent of formal employees received envelope wages from their formal employer in 2007, amounting to on average 43 per cent of their gross wage (Williams and Padmore, 2013a,b prevalence of envelope wages was much lower in Western and Nordic nations and the share of the gross wage received as an envelope wage lower. In Southern and Central and Eastern Europe meanwhile, envelope wages were more prevalent, and the proportion received as an envelope wage was higher (e.g., Williams, 2009e, 2013 . Croatia was not included in this early survey. However, Croatia was included when the special Eurobarometer survey was repeated in 2013. Special Eurobarometer no. 402 involved face-to-face interviews with 11,025 employees from 28 countries (European Commission, 2014) . This revealed that one in 33 employees received under-reported salaries in the year prior to the survey and that similar EU regional variations persisted with envelope wages more prevalent in Southern and East-Central Europe where the proportion of the wage received as an envelope wage was also higher (Williams and Horodnic, 2017) . Indeed, in Croatia, 8.2% of employees asserted that they had received envelope wages in the year prior to the survey (compared with only 3% across the EU28) and that 30% of their salary was received as an envelope wage.
This survey was repeated in 2015 using the same sampling methodology as the Eurobarometer survey to achieve a nationally representative sample as part of the GREY project. The finding was that the proportion of employees receiving envelope wages in the prior 12 months had decreased from 8.2% in 2013 to 6.6% in late 2015 (see Figure 1) . However, there is a need for caution regarding this purported decrease given the small sample and number of respondents either refusing to answer or who did not know. Turning to the proportion of their take-home pay received as an envelope wage, Figure 2 reports the results from the 2015 GREY survey of employees. This reveals that the greatest number of respondents received 25-39% of their take-home pay in cash. Every fourth participant was receiving between 40% and 50% of their total payment as an envelope wage, while for almost three out of ten in under-declared employment the envelope wage was larger than the official payment. On the other hand, only a few individuals stated their employer was giving them up to 25% of the total wage in cash. On average, 30% of their take-home pay was in the form of an envelope wage. The average net wage in May 2015 was HRK 5,679 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2015a). As Figure 3 displays, a substantial portion of those in under-declared employment earn above the average national wage, suggesting that the payment of envelope wages is not confined to lowincome groups of the employed. Indeed, one in six of those receiving envelope wages earn more than HRK 10,000 per month. Official data for March 2014 shows that only 6.2% of Croatians in paid employment had a net monthly wage above HRK 10,000 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2015b). Source: Author's own calculation based on the GREY 2015 employees survey It is sometimes proposed that when deciding on the size of the declared official salary, employers pay employees the minimum wage as their declared salary, and the rest as an unofficial undeclared (envelope) wage. The finding of this study, however, is that this is not always the case. Analysing the net monthly wage officially earned, Figure 4 shows that only one fifth of under-declared employees received the minimum wage as their declared salary. The minimum gross wage for 2015 was HRK 3,029.55 (Official Gazette, 2014a) , which gives a net monthly wage of HRK 2,423.64. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT
Under-declared employment occurs when a formal employer pays a formal employee an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to the official declared salary (Williams, 2010 (Williams, , 2012a (Williams, ,b, 2014a Woolfson, 2007) . This envelope wage is usually agreed when an employer offers the person a job. Alongside agreeing to pay an official declared wage which is set out in a formal written contract, the employer at the same time reaches a verbal unwritten agreement with the employee to pay an additional undeclared 'envelope' wage that will not be declared to the authorities for tax and social security purposes. It therefore arises from fraudulent labour contracts where the pay (and sometimes conditions of employment) in the written contract differ to those that are verbally agreed (Williams and Horodnic, 2017) . Unless the employee agrees to this verbal contract, then generally they do not get offered the job (Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a) . This verbal contract, therefore, replaces the formal written contract of employment, and in doing so, constitutes the unwritten 'psychological contract' regarding the conditions of employment of the employee (Rousseau, 1995) . Although verbal agreements are legal and hold the same weight in law as written contracts, this particular verbal contract is illegal because it fraudulently under-reports the salary of the employee with the explicit intention of evading the full tax and social security payments owed by the employee and employer. In this section, firstly, the reasons employers engage in this fraudulent wage practice are briefly analysed, secondly, what conditions, if any, are attached to the payment of envelope wages, thirdly, what envelope wages are paid for (e.g., for overtime/extra work or for the main contract), fourthly, the attitude of employees to receiving an additional undeclared (envelope) wage and fifth and finally, whether the employer or employee instigated the decision to pay envelope wages.
Why do employers pay envelope wages?
Superficially, the reason employers engage in this fraudulent wage practice is simple. Employers do not have to pay the full tax and social contributions owed to the state if a portion of the total salary of an employee is not declared. As such, employers weigh up the benefits in terms of money saved, against the costs in terms of probability of detection and penalties, and decide to pay envelope wages. This cost saving could hypothetically either be kept by the employer or used to pay the employee a higher salary, or a combination of the two. The problem with this rational economic actor explanation, however, is that it does not explain why some employers decide to fraudulently pay envelope wages and others do not. The fact is that even if the rational economic decision would be for employers to pay envelope wages, many do not. Instead, they voluntarily comply (Murphy, 2008) .
In recent years, a social actor approach has emerged to explain this. Reflecting institutional theory (North, 1990) , this views participation in under-declared employment to arise when the beliefs and norms of employers and employees (i.e., the informal institutions) are not aligned with the laws and regulations which constitute the formal institutions (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b) , and thus there is a lack of 'vertical trust'. The result is that employees and employers who do not accept the formal 'rules of the game', such as due to their belief that the state is corrupt or that they do not receive from the state the public goods they deserve for the taxes they pay, engage in under-declared employment (Williams and Horodnic, 2016) .
In consequence, although under-declared employment superficially appears to be simply a way of employers saving costs by reducing their tax and social contributions owed, this illegal practice only occurs if employers (and employees) do not accept the formal 'rules of the game' (i.e., the codified laws and regulations). This prevails for a variety of reasons, including a lack of trust in government and politicians, a perception that the state is corrupt, and the belief that among employers and employees that they do not receive the public goods they deserve for the taxes and social contributions paid.
What conditions are attached to the payment of envelope wages?
Until now, very little, if any, research has been undertaken on whether additional conditions are included when this verbal contract is agreed and, if so, the type of additional conditions included by employers. These conditions might include firstly, that the employee will not take their full statutory entitlement to annual leave, secondly, that they will work longer hours than in their formal contract (which might mean working more than the maximum hours in the working hours
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Undeclared Work (CRO MOONLIGHTING)" 10 directive and/or being paid less than the minimum hourly wage), and/or thirdly, that they will undertake a different job in terms of tasks and responsibilities to that specified in their formal contract (Williams, 2014a,b) . The 2015 GREY employees survey, however, evaluates this issue. The finding is that 39% of employees stated that there were no additional conditions. Some 61% of employees therefore state that additional conditions were attached. Analysing these:  34% were asked to work longer working hours than stated in their written contract;  27% were asked to conduct different tasks to those in their written contract;  19% were asked not to take their full statutory holiday allowance, and  5% stated other conditions. The percentages do not add up to the figure of 61%, to clarify, because employees could select more than one condition if multiple additional conditions were attached to their envelope wages.
Are envelope wages paid for overtime or regular work?
Examining whether envelope wages are paid for the regular work of employees, or for overtime/extra work, the 2015 GREY employees survey reveals that:
 47% receive envelope wages for their regular work;  29% receive envelope wages for overtime/extra work, and  24% receive envelope wages for both their regular work and overtime/extra work. In 29% of cases, therefore, envelope wages were paid for work beyond that stated in the contract for overtime and/or extra work. This suggests that this illegitimate practice is a tactic used by some employers to cope with temporary increases in demand.
What is the attitude of employees to being paid envelope wages?
Analysing the attitude of employees towards being paid envelope wages, the finding of the 2015 GREY employees survey is that:
 55% would prefer full declaration of their salary;  23% say it depends;  19% are happy receiving under-declared (envelope) wages, and  3% do not know or refused to answer. The fact that only 55% would prefer full declaration of their salary means that it will prove difficult during workplace inspections to elicit 'whistle-blowing' behaviour from employees, and even those not happy with this arrangement, may fear losing their job if they whistle blow.
Envelope wages: an employer-or employee-instigated decision?
Until now, there has been an assumption that under-declared employment is a result of employers seeking to reduce their tax and social security contributions. However, given that under-declared employment is an agreement between an employee and employer, the 2015
Twinning Project HR 12 IB SO 01 -"Strengthening Policy and Capacities to Reduce
Undeclared Work (CRO MOONLIGHTING)"
11
GREY employee survey evaluated whether this was always the case. Every employee receiving envelope wages was asked 'Who suggested paying this additional salary which would not be declared to the authorities?'. Three different answers were possible: the employer initiated the arrangement; the worker requested to be under-declared; and under-declaration was a joint idea. As Figure 5 reveals, under-declaration in Croatia is most commonly an initiative of the employer in seven out of ten cases reported. This finding is not surprising given the benefits to employers from this fraudulent behaviour, which is not always the case for employees (Hazans, 2005; Round et al., 2008) . Many Croatian employees, nevertheless, seem to believe that it is in their interest to accept envelope wages, perhaps based on the idea that they will receive higher take-home pay. Indeed, in 30% of cases, the employee reported that they were active in selecting this arrangement, albeit in most cases this was a joint idea, with only a small proportion of employees starting it was their idea alone to under-report their salary (accounting for 10% of all under-declared employment). Indeed, Franic (2017) draws a distinction between four types of employee receiving envelope wages according to their reasons for engaging in under-declared employment. These four types are:
Employee-initiated 10%
Joint idea 20%
Employerinitiated 70%
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 Under-declared by deception -for a typical Croatian worker the phrase 'income from employment' strictly means 'take-home pay'. Employers, therefore, will offer a job to a person at a certain take-home pay but not mention that only a portion of this will be the official declared salary and the rest will be paid as an undeclared (envelope) wage.  Reluctant voluntarists -these workers give their consent to under-declaration, which is not the case with those who were deceived, but they do so reluctantly and are not happy with this arrangement. Their decision to do so arises out of desperation given the lack of alternative employment opportunities.  Monetary rationalists -an employer offers a job candidate either a higher take-home pay with a low amount as a declared salary and the rest as an envelope wage, or a much lower take-home pay if the salary is fully declared, and allows the employee to decide. Given that the employee chooses the higher take-home pay, they are described as 'monetary rationalists'.  Pure voluntarists -these employees give their unconditional agreement to receive envelope wages, and are often in the upper tier of the hierarchy in their companies or in lower tiers but with an extraordinary level of trust between them and their employers.
DISTRIBUTION OF UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT
To evaluate the distribution of under-declared employment, first, who receives envelope wages is evaluated (e.g., age, gender, educational level, household financial situation, occupational characteristics, locality type and region), and secondly, which employers pay envelope wages (e.g., what sectors, sizes of employer and business types).
Who receives envelope wages?
When examining the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics of those in underdeclared employment, the finding is that all groups of the population are involved, albeit some more than others. As Table 1 reveals, under-declared employment is far more prevalent among men than among women, while young people aged 15-24 years old are the group most likely to be paid envelope wages. Those who finish their education between 16 and 19 years of age are also more likely to be receiving envelope wages, and so too are skilled manual workers the most susceptible to these practices. Yet an interesting finding is that highly educated professionals (such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects) are also highly likely to receive undeclared envelope wages in comparison with other occupations, with the only exception being skilled manual workers. Furthermore, this practice is much more common in large towns, where 21.6% of employed respondents stated they are receiving envelope wages. When it comes to regional differences, envelope wages are the most prevalent in Zagreb and surrounding area (12.1%), followed by Slavonia (10%). These findings are further reinforced when analysing the results of the 2015 GREY survey of employees. As Table 2 reveals, the finding is again that men and younger age groups are more likely to receive envelope wages, although the spatial variations differ to the earlier survey with under-declared employment slightly more prevalent in rural areas and villages and in North Croatia. It is also found to be more prevalent among single, windowed and divorced individuals, those in full-time employment and who believe that a large proportion of the population are engaged in the undeclared economy. This latter point is particularly important since it shows that under-declared employment is much more prevalent among those where 'horizontal trust' is lacking, namely they believe that the majority of the population are non-compliant. Table 3 reveals that agriculture (28.3% of employees receive envelope wages) and construction (16.1% receive envelope wages) are the sectors facing the most profound problems with underdeclaration of wages. It is also prevalent among employees in the household services sector (15.5%) and the hospitality sector (9.4%). On the other hand, the lowest frequency of quasiformal workers was recorded among individuals engaged in transport of goods (3.2%), as well as among those conducting various personal services (3.1%). Further evidence of the type of business engaged in under-declared employment is provided by the GREY employers survey. As Table 4 reveals, hiring an employee on envelope wages is perceived by employers to be a common practice among their competitors. Some 1 in 20 employers assert that competitor businesses always pay envelope wages, and a further 1 in 5 (22%) assert that this occurs in most cases, 57% sometimes, and only 16% of employers' assert that this never occurs among their competitors. Table 5 evaluates the proportion of employers across different sectors who state that competitors use under-declared employment either always or in most cases. A high proportion (44%) of employers in the hotels and restaurant sector assert that competitors use under-declared employment always or in most cases, 28% of employers in the transport and communications sector, 27% in the construction sector, and 26% in services, but none in the utilities sector and only 5% in manufacturing industry. When asked the portion of the salary paid as an envelope wage by competitors, employers asserted that on average, 24% of total wage payments are paid unofficially as an envelope wage.
It should be noted that in the employee survey, employees stated that this figure was 30%, suggesting that in broad terms somewhere around one-quarter to one-third of take-home pay appears to be paid as an envelope wage among those in under-declared employment.
Having analysed the prevalence of under-declared employment, the characteristics of this type of employment relationship, and who engages in such work, attention now turns towards an investigation of the systemic drivers underpinning the prevalence of under-declared employment. The argument here is that tackling under-declared employment requires both macro-level changes in the economic and social conditions as well as effective policy measures to deal with the issue on a more day-to-day basis by inspectorates.
SYSTEMIC DRIVERS OF UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT
Studies of cross-national variations in under-declared employment reveal that its prevalence is strongly associated with specific economic and social conditions (Autio and Fu, 2015; Horodnic, 2016; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams, 2014b; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a ,b, 2016 , 2017 . The aim of this section is to highlight these economic and social conditions in order to show that although developing effective policy measures to deal with the problem of under-declared employment by inspectorates is important, it is also necessary to deal with the structural causes. This means tackling the macro-level economic and social conditions that are beyond the remit of inspectorates but within the remit of governments.
To explain under-declared employment, it has become increasingly popular to use the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990) . In this perspective, all societies have codified laws and regulations (i.e., formal institutions) that define the legal rules of the game. They also have informal institutions which are the 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels' (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727) . When these formal and informal institutions are aligned, little or no under-declared employment will exist since the socially shared norms, values and beliefs of employees and employers will be aligned with the formal rules. However, when they are not in symmetry, such as when there is a lack of trust in government and the rule of law, practices such an envelope wages emerge that although socially legitimate, are illegal in terms of the formal rules. The greater the institutional asymmetry in a society, the greater will be the prevalence of envelope wages.
The argument is that this lack of alignment, and thus the prevalence of under-declared employment, is caused by formal institutional failings and imperfections. If under-declared employment is to be tackled, therefore, these formal institutional failings and imperfections need to be solved. Which formal institutional imperfections, therefore, cause institutional asymmetry and the prevalence of envelope wages? As Williams (2013) and Williams and Horodnic (2015a) highlight, there are three dominant theories. These variously identify the country-level structural conditions that lead to under-declared employment as: under-development and a lack of modernisation of government, including corruption (modernisation theory); high taxes and burdensome regulations and controls (state over-interference theory), and inadequate state intervention and protection of workers (state under-intervention theory).
In recent years, a body of research has tested these theories by evaluating the relationship between cross-national variations in the prevalence of under-declared employment in the EU28 and cross-national variations in various economic and social conditions/formal institutional failings related to each theory (Franic, 2017; Williams, 2013; Horodnic, 2015a, 2017) . The key findings are that the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in:
 wealthier economies, measured in terms of GNP per capita.  societies with modern state bureaucracies and lower levels of public sector corruption.  countries with lower levels of severe material deprivation.  more equal societies.  greater levels of expenditure on labour market interventions to protect vulnerable groups.  more effective policies of redistribution via social transfers to protect workers from poverty. Croatia is poorer performing than other member states in relation to many of these macro-level structural determinants of the prevalence of under-declared employment, including GDP per capita, government effectiveness, public sector corruption and trust in public institutions (European Commission, 2007; Eurostat, 2016a; Transparency International, 2017; World Bank, 2015) . The reason under-declared employment is lower in such countries is most selfexplanatory. Employees in such countries are less more likely to be pushed into such illegal wage arrangements out of necessity and as a survival strategy due to the lack of alternative means of livelihood.
The most important finding across all these studies, importantly, is that under-declared employment is lower in societies where the norms and beliefs of employers and employees are closely aligned with the codified laws and regulations (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a ,b, 2016 , 2017 . The greater the alignment, the lower is the level of under-declared employment. To tackle the lack of alignment, therefore, the above stated formal institutional failings and imperfections that result in under-declared employment need to be solved.
There are also policy initiatives that can be pursued by inspectorates however, many of which at the same time as tackling the problem of under-declared employment also address some of these macro-level structural determinants. It is to this issue about what inspectorates can do to most effectively tackle under-declared employment that is now addressed.
STRATEGIES AND CAPACITIES TO TACKLE UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT
There is now a strong international consensus that the aim of governments is not to eradicate the undeclared economy, but to move undeclared work into the declared economy (Dekker et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2013; European Commission, 2007a; ILO, 2015; Small Business Council, 2004; Williams, 2014 Williams, , 2017a Williams and Nadin, 2012a ,b, 2013 . The same applies to tackling under-declared employment. There is an emergent consensus across the EU28 that the objective is not to eradicate jobs where envelope wages are paid, but to transform these jobs into fully declared employment. The intention, therefore, is to eradicate envelope wage payments but not the jobs themselves. Table 6 displays the full range of tools available for transforming under-declared employment into fully declared employment. On the one hand, there are 'hard' direct tools. These transform under-declared employment into fully declared employment by ensuring that costs of under-declared employment are outweighed by the benefits of employers using, and employees being in, fully declared employment. This is accomplished by using deterrence measures to increase the costs of under-declared employment ('sticks') and/or by making fully declared employment more beneficial and easier ('carrots'). On the other hand, there are 'soft' indirect tools. These shift away from using 'sticks' and 'carrots', and instead focus on dealing with the formal institutional failings in the last section so as to repair the social contract between the state and its citizens in order to foster self-regulation.
Hard direct policy measures
Hard direct policy measures seek to transform under-declared employment into fully declared employment by ensuring that costs of under-declared employment are outweighed by the benefits of employers using, and employees being in, fully declared employment. Viewing employers (and employees) as rational economic actors who engage in under-declared employment when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of detection and punishment, the objective is to change the cost/benefit ratio facing those participating or considering participation in under-declared employment (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001 ). This can be achieved in two ways:
 Deterrence measures detect and punish non-compliant ('bad') behaviour (i.e., underdeclared employment). This is achieved by firstly, improving the perceived or actual probability of detection and/or secondly, raising the sanctions and penalties for those caught. This 'negative reinforcement' approach thus tackles under-declared employment using 'sticks' to punish this illegal activity.  Incentive measures make it easier to undertake, and reward, fully declared employment.
To achieve this, authorities can use either: o Preventative measures to stop employers and employees entering into envelope wage practices (e.g., by making it beneficial to operate on a fully declared basis); or o Curative measures to incentivise workers and businesses to make the transition to the fully declared realm, such as by offering amnesties or voluntary disclosure for those coming forward. Source: abridged and amended from Williams (2014a) The problem with using hard direct measures is that those operating on an under-declared basis are not always rational economic actors purely calculating the costs and benefits. They are also social actors paying and receiving envelope wages because there is lack of alignment between their own morality and the laws and regulations, such as due to a lack of trust in the state and what it is seeking to achieve.
Soft indirect policy measures
Soft indirect policy measures therefore seek to deal with the formal institutional failings and repair the social contract between the state and its citizens so as to foster greater selfregulation (Alm et al., 1995; Torgler, 2003; Wenzel, 2004) . The intention is to seek a voluntary commitment to fully declared employment rather than force employers and employees to comply using threats, harassment and/or incentives (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007 Torgler, , 2011 . Under-declared employment occurs where formal institutional failings lead to employers' and employees' norms and beliefs differing to the laws and regulations, meaning that what formal institutions denote as illegal activities are seen as socially legitimate. To tackle under-declared employment therefore, there is a need to address the formal institutional failings and repair the social contract. To align citizen morality with state morality, one can either:  Change the informal institutions -to change the norms and beliefs of employers and employees regarding the acceptability of under-declared employment, authorities can use awareness raising campaigns and educational initiatives about the costs of underdeclared employment and benefits of fully declared work.  Change the formal institutions -this is particularly important in societies in which there is a lack of trust in government, such as due to public sector corruption, or in societies where employers and employees do not believe that they receive back from government what they expect. This can involve either: o Changes in the internal processes of the formal institutions to improve the perception amongst employers and employees that there is procedural and distributive fairness and justice, and/or o Change in the products of formal institutions by pursuing wider economic and social developments, as discussed in the last section. The emerging evidence-base is that the 'best practice' when tackling under-declared 9and undeclared) employment is to combine hard direct and soft indirect policy measures (Williams, 2014a (Williams, , 2017a Williams and Renooy, 2013) . For example, governments may pursue more effective social transfer policy initiatives to tackle poverty and provide a welfare 'safety net' , culture changes in ministries towards a more customer-oriented approach, and introduce publicity campaigns to elicit greater self-regulation, but may also introduce incentives (e.g., amnesties) to enable under-declared employment to move into the fully declared realm. At the same time, and in relation to those failing to adhere to the formal rules, they may also pursue improvements in the probability of detection and tougher sanctions for those subsequently caught. The debate therefore is not over whether to use either soft indirect tools or hard direct measures. The emergent evidence-base is that both are required to effectively tackle under-declared employment. Rather the debate is over how to combine and sequence the various hard direct and soft indirect measures. Two contrasting approaches exist for doing this:
 Responsive regulation -this views a regulatory pyramid, with the least intrusive soft indirect controls used first, and the most intrusive hard direct controls at the top and used last. The belief is that state authorities do not in most instances need to use the coercion option at the top of the pyramid to encourage compliant behaviour. Instead, the state can commence with the soft direct control measures at the bottom of the pyramid and if these fail to change the behaviour of some groups, then the degree of intrusiveness can escalate until it reaches the required intervention that will cause compliant behaviour. There is therefore recognition of a continuum of attitudes towards acting legally and different policy responses available that are temporally sequenced commencing with soft indirect control measures, then incentives and only if these fail, then sanctions are used (Braithwaite, 2003) . The Australian government for example has pursued this 'responsive regulation' approach. In the first instance, soft indirect controls encourage self-regulation, and this is followed by persuasion and only punitive measures as a last resort (Braithwaite, 2003; Job et al., 2007) .  Slippery slope framework -this argues that employers and employees comply either because they fear detection and fines due to the power of authorities (enforced compliance) or because they wish to comply because they trust the authorities (voluntary cooperation). When there is effective enforced compliance and high voluntary cooperation (i.e., both power and trust), under-declared employment will be absent. When there is ineffective enforced compliance and little voluntary cooperation, under-declared employment will be extensive (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Alm et al., 2012; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014; Kirchler et al., 2008; Kogler et al., 2015; Muehlbacher et al., 2011a,b; Prinz et al., 2013) . This recognition that both effective enforced compliance and high voluntary cooperation are essential for combating under-declared employment is now being taken seriously by authorities in various countries (Williams, 2017a,b) . Indeed, it is this analytical framework and policy approach that is the basis for the next section which adopts an evidence-based approach to identifying good practice when tackling under-declared employment.
EVIDENCE-BASED EVALUATION OF GOOD PRACTICE
To evaluate the effectiveness of these hard direct and soft indirect policy approaches in Croatia, an evidence-based empirical evaluation is here undertaken of whether hard direct and soft indirect controls are effective at firstly, reducing the participation of employees in under-declared employment and secondly, reducing the participation of employers in this illegal wage practice.
Evaluating policy measures to reduce employee participation
The participation of employees in under-declared employment can be reduced firstly, using a 'hard' direct controls approach which pursues changes in the cost/benefit ratio confronting employees and employers, usually by increasing the penalties and risks of detection, and/or secondly, by aligning the norms and beliefs of employees about the acceptability of operating on an undeclared basis with the codified laws and regulations. Table 7 reveals the perception of employees regarding the risk of detection, the penalties for operating on an undeclared basis, and whether their attitudes towards operating on an undeclared basis are aligned with the laws and regulations (here termed their 'tax morale').
These findings indicate that individuals who perceive the risk of detection as very high are slightly more likely to receive envelope wages (7.5%) than those who denote the risk as fairly small (7.2%). On the whole, however, there does not seem to be a strong association between whether employees engage in under-declared employment and their perceptions of the risks of detection. This is not the case with the penalties. Under-declared employment is more common among employees who believe that a fine will result in addition to paying the taxes and contributions owed if caught (7.9%) than amongst those who do not believe that will be any additional fine (5.2%). This perhaps displays, therefore, that employees in Croatia recognise that they will not be held responsible for engaging in under-declared employment so sanctions do not particularly matter to them, since they view their employer as the one who will be sanctioned by the state authorities. To measure whether employees' attitudes regarding the acceptability of operating on an undeclared basis align with the laws and regulations, tax morale was measured. To do so, employees were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is totally unacceptable and 10 is totally acceptable, six different types of undeclared work. The higher the tax morale value, therefore, the greater is the non-alignment of their attitudes with the laws and regulations (i.e., the lower is their tax morale). The finding is a very strong association between the likelihood of employees receiving envelope wages and their tax morale. The higher is their tax morale (i.e., the greater is the alignment of their beliefs with the laws and regulations), the lower is the likelihood of employees participating in under-declared employment.
To evaluate whether the participation of employees in under-declared employment is associated with their perceptions regarding the risk of detection, the penalties for operating undeclared and their 'tax morale', when socio-demographic and regional characteristics are included and held constant, Table 8 reports a logit regression analysis. This reveals no association between the participation of employees in under-declared employment and the perceived level of penalties and risk of detection, but a strong association between employees' participation in under-declared employment and their views on the acceptability of operating undeclared (i.e., their lack of alignment with the laws and regulations). This confirms in the Croatian context that there is a need to move beyond using hard direct policy measures (i.e., 'sticks' and 'carrots') with regard to employees, and to focus upon the use of soft indirect policy measures to improve the tax morale of employees so as to encourage greater voluntary compliance. Source: 2015 GREY employees survey
Evaluating policy measures to reduce employer participation
What however, is the association between the perceived risk of detection and levels of penalties, and tax morale, as determinants of employer participation in under-declared employment when firm characteristics and the characteristics of the employer are included and held constant? Table 9 reports the results using logit model estimations. This reveals that although the severity of the penalty does not determine whether employers pay envelope wages, the risk of detection is a significant determinant of whether employers engage in salary under-reporting. Unlike employees, therefore, improving the perceived risk of detection does have a significant impact on reducing the likelihood of employers paying envelope wages. This additional important finding is that besides the risk of detection being a significant determinant of whether employers pay envelope wages, so too is there a correlation with tax morale. The higher is their tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of employers paying envelope wages, although this is not statistically significant. This suggests that although the primary focus should be upon increasing the perceived risk of detection among employers, a secondary focus should be upon soft indirect policy measures to improve the tax morale of employers to encourage greater voluntary compliance.
Policy recommendations
This evidence-based evaluation reveals the need for the adoption of different policy approaches when tackling employers and employees participating in under-declared employment. There is a need to move beyond the hard direct controls approach with regard to employees, which seeks to deter employee engagement in under-declared employment by increasing the penalties and risk of detection. When tackling employees receiving envelope wages, an indirect controls approach which improves the tax morale of employees is required so as to encourage greater self-regulation and a culture of commitment to compliance among employees.
To tackle employers paying envelope wages, however, it is primarily the risk of detection that needs to be addressed followed only secondarily by improvements in their tax morale. Increasing the perceived level of penalties has no impact on the probability of employers under-reporting employee wages. The currently widely used deterrence approach therefore needs to focus upon increasing the risk of detection, rather than increasing the penalties, and also to be complemented by a tax morale approach.
What policy measures are required, therefore, to ensure that employers view there to be a higher risk of detection? Improving the probability of detection of under-declared employment is difficult due to the problems of identifying it during workplace inspections. This is because they are a formal employee with a written contract or terms of employment and a declared salary, and as has been shown, only 55% of employees receiving envelope wages would prefer full declaration. Moreover, those who might like to whistle blow fear that they might lose their job if they do so.
For this reason, a shift away from workplace inspections and towards data analysis is required when detecting under-declared employment. For example, data systems are required that can put together data on average earnings in firms and cross-tabulate this with average salaries in their region and/or sector, or by occupation, in order to analyse whether organisations pay below the average wage for their region and/or sector, or for particular occupations. Identifying potential organisations paying envelope wages using such data analysis, so as to enable targeted inspections, however, does not help when it comes to employers and employees admitting during a subsequent inspection visit that they receive an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to their declared salary.
For this reason, it is thus perhaps the perceived risk of detection that needs to be improved, rather than actual probability of detection. To improve the perceived risk of detection requires a marketing campaign targeted at employers which informs them that effective tools are being developed to identify those organisations paying envelope wages, and that unless employers put their affairs in order, then they will be caught in a matter of time. Such a marketing campaign might publicise in the media (e.g., newspapers, television) individual cases where employers have been caught who pay envelope wages. This marketing campaign might run alongside either an amnesty for employers who decide to fully declare their workers in a certain time period, or for those who voluntarily disclose to the authorities that they have been paying envelope wages, it may be decreed that no penalties will be imposed or a limited level of sanctions. This could then be coupled with the threat of severe sanctions for those who fail to put their affairs in order within a time limit. Increasing the perceived risk of detection using a marketing campaign about the growing probability of detection, and coupling this other initiatives (e.g., amnesties or penalty-free voluntary disclosure, followed by harsher penalties for those not coming forward), is one way forward.
However, there is also a need for broader awareness raising and education about the benefits of fully declared work targeted at both employers and employees. For employers, such an awareness raising campaign could be targeted at those regions and/or sectors where salary under-reporting is more prevalent, namely agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants, transport and communications, and household services.
For employees, meanwhile, such an awareness raising campaign could be targeted particularly at younger men, especially in the sectors and/or regions stated above where envelope wages are prevalent. This should focus upon the benefits of not under-reporting salaries and the costs of doing so in terms of the future benefits foregone (e.g., lack of access to credit/loans, welfare benefits, and even being officially recognised as a full-time rather than part-time employee in some cases).
More widely, there is a need for awareness-raising initiatives to educate citizens about the wider benefits of taxation in terms of the public goods and services that they receive in return for the taxes they pay. Such policy initiatives might include:  introducing into the civics curriculum in schools the issue of taxation and adhering to labour legislation;  letters to employees as taxpayers which detail how their taxes are being spent, and  signs stating 'your taxes paid for this' on roads, ambulances and fire engines, and in hospitals, doctors surgeries, schools and universities. Such awareness raising and educational initiatives, however, will not reduce underdeclared employment unless there are changes in the macro-level economic and social conditions highlighted above, and especially the perceived level of corruption and quality of governance that results in employers and employees engaging in under-declared employment due to a belief that distributive and redistributive justice and fairness is lacking. A modernisation of governance is therefore required to tackle the formal institutional failings and imperfections that result in employers and employees viewing salary under-reporting as acceptable.
Here, it is simply important to state that voluntary compliance and tax morale improves when employees and employers: believe they pay their fair share compared with others (Kirchgässner, 2010 (Kirchgässner, , 2011 Molero and Pujol, 2012) ; view the state authorities as being respectful, impartial and responsible in how they treat them (Gangl et al., 2013; Murphy, 2005) , and believe that for the taxes paid, they receive an appropriate level and range of public goods and services (McGee, 2005) . Further details of how this can be implemented will be included in a follow-up action plan and road map for tackling undeclared and under-declared work in Croatia.
